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SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE ROLE OF THE
JUDGE UNDER THE SWISS CIVIL CODE
Alfred E. von Overbeck*
1.

INTRODUCTION 1

Although Switzerland certainly is not a "mixed civil law and common
law jurisdiction," 2 its legal system attributes to judges a measure of
freedom which seems greater than they have in other civil law jurisdictions
and might be of some interest, especially for American lawyers.
A few historical remarks may be useful. Switzerland grew from the
union, in 1291, of three very small rural communities situated around the
*

Professor of Law, University of Fribourg (Switzerland).

1. The most important books and articles on the subject are the following,
which are cited by the name of the author, and where there are several publications
listed by the abbreviation indicated.
2 H. DESCHENAUX, DER EINLEITUNGSTITEL, SCHWEIZERISCHES PRIVATRECHT
1-281 (Basel 1967) [hereinafter cited as DESCHENAUX]; also in French: LE TITRE
PRILIMINAIRE DU CODE CIVIL 109 (Fribourg) [hereinafter cited after the German
edition]; C. Du Pasquier, Les lacunes de la loi et la jurisprudencedu Tribunal fidiral
suisse sur I'art. ler Code Civil Suisse, BASLER STUDIEN ZUR RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT,
no. 31 (Bale 1951) [hereinafter cited as Du Pasquier]; 0. A. GERMANN, PROBLEME
UND METHODEN DER RECHTSFINDUNG (2d ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as GERMANN];
A. MEIER-HAYOZ, DER RICHTER ALS GESETZGEBER (Zilrich 195 1) [hereinafter cited as
MEIER-HAYOZ]; MEIER-HAYOZ, BERNER KOMMENTAR ZUM SCHWEIZERISCHEN
PRIVATRECHT, Einleitung Arts. 1-10, on Art. I at 78 et seq. and Art. 4 at 421 et seq.
(Berne reprint 1966) [hereinafter cited as KOMMENTAR]; MEIER-HAYOZ, LUCKEN
INTRA LEGEM]; RECHTSFINDUNG, BEITRAGE ZUR JURISTISCHEN METHODENLEHRE,
FESTSCHRIFr FOR 0. A. GERMANN ZUM 80 GEBURTSTAG 149 (Berne 1969) [hereinafter
cited as FESTSCHRIFT GERMANNI; MEIER-HAYOZ, UEBER GESCHRIEBENES UND UNGESCHRIEBENES RECHT, RECUEIL DE TRAVAUX SUISSES PRtStNTES AU Vie CONGRPS
INTERNATIONAL DE DROIT COMPARt 1 (Bale 1976); MEIER-HAYOZ, DER RICHTER ALS
GESETZGEBER (ZUR RECHTSPOLITISCHEN KOMPONENTE RICHTERLICHER TATIGKEIT),
FESTSCHR1FT ZUM 70 GEBURTSTAG VON DR. IUR. M. GULDENER 189 (Ziirich 1973)
[hereinafter cited as FESTSCHRIFr GULDENER]; B. Schnyder, Entgegen dem Wortlaut. . . Erhaltung und Entfaltung des Rechts in der Rechtsprechung des
Sch weizerischen Bundesgerichtsin FESTGABE DER SCHWEIZERISCHEN RECHTSFAKULTATEN ZUR HUNDERTJAHRFEIER DES BUNDESGERICHTS 29 (FESTGABE Swiss FEDERAL
COURT, Basel 1975) [hereinafter cited as B. Schnyder]; P. TUOR & SCHNYDER,
SCHWEIZERISCHES ZIVILGESETZBUCH 29 et seq. (9th ed. Zurich 1975) [hereinafter
cited as TUOR & SCHNYDER].
See also the bibliography in KOMMENTAR, supra note 1, at nos. 15 et seq. re Art.
1, and nos. 3 et seq. re Art. 4. Generally this volume gives an excellent introduction to
the Swiss Civil Code.
2. See T. B. Smith, Law Reform in a Mixed 'Civil Law'and 'Common Law'
Jurisdiction, 35 LA. L. REV. 927 (1975).
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lake of Lucerne, into a loose and complicated system of alliances. The only
central power was the "Tagsatzung" in which the unanimity rule prevailed. The invasion of the French revolutionary troops in 1798 created for a
few years a centralized state, followed for ten years by an "Acte de
midiation" imposed by Napoleon but well adapted to Swiss conditions in
many respects. However, after the Congress of Vienna, Switzerland was
restored to a confederation having not much more central power than before
1798. After much political turmoil, a Federal Constitution was accepted in
1848, followed by the more centralizing Constitution of 1874 which,
though heavily amended, is still in force. There are many points (for
instance, the bicameral system) in these Constitutions which were influenced by the American Constitution.
Under the Constitution of 1848, the Federal State legislated in matters
of civil status and some aspects of marriage. This power was admitted on the
rather weak base of the constitutional right of religious freedom. The
Constitution of 1874 was more specific in this respect and in fact made
further additions. An amendment accepted in 1898 gave the Federal State
3
power to legislate in all fields of private law.
At the same time, criminal law became a federal matter. However,
public and administrative law, including civil and criminal procedure,
remained as law of the Cantons (it is not feasible here to enter into details of
the distinction between private and public law as it is drawn in Switzerland).
A permanent Federal Court (Bundesgericht, Tribunalfidral), was established in 1874 to ensure uniformity of federal law.
In the course of the nineteenth century, most Cantons replaced the
traditional customary law and local statutes by codifications of their own.
The French-and Italian-speaking Cantons adapted the French Civil Code to
their needs, while other Cantons, including Berne, had Codes based on the
General Civil Code of Austria. A few Cantons developed more original
codifications. The most important was the Code of the Canton of Zurich,
drafted by Bluntschli. It was based on German science but took into account
traditional institutions such as cooperatives.
It is obvious that in a country covering an area of about one third of
Louisiana, divided into 22 Cantons (three of which are subdivided in two
semi-Cantons), the development of modern transportation along with
economic conditions and mobility of population would make unification of
private law more and more necessary. A statute of 1850 dealt with marriages

3. On the history of codification, see P. Liver, Aligemeine Einleitung in
KOMMENTAR, supra note 1, at 7 [hereinafter cited as Liver].
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between persons of different religions, and a statute of 1862 with their
divorces. Under the new Constitution, a more comprehensive statute on
marriage and divorce was passed by
Parliament in 1874 and accepted by the
4
voters with a very slim majority.
In 1881 the law of obligations and commercial law were unified in a
Code of Obligations. Revised in 1907, this was to become the fifth book of
the Swiss Civil Code. In 1889, there followed a statute on bankruptcy and
attachment for debt. In 1891, a statute on conflict of laws and jurisdictions
came into force; it was designed primarily to deal with conflicts between
Cantons, but was extended to international conflicts, to which it still
applies.
The Swiss Civil Code was drafted and adopted in a comparatively short
time. This is to a large extent due to the merit of one man, Eugen Huber. He
first wrote a comparative work on the laws of the Cantons, 5 and was the
author of successive drafts and commentaries. 6 He took a leading role in the
Committee of Experts which discussed the draft and was a Member of
Parliament when the Code was adopted.
An extended appraisal of the content of the Swiss Civil Code would be
out of place in this context. Suffice it to say that at the beginning of the
century, it could be considered as progressive concerning the protection of
persons and personal freedom, and also concerning the expression of social
ideas such as the welfare of the child.
The Code still retains its original structure, though important changes
have been made. In the Code of Obligations, company law was revised in
1938, and the law of the contracts of employment in 1972. The whole of
family law in the Swiss Civil Code is under revision. A new law of adoption
was enacted in 1973. A new Child Law, which would completely abolish
any discrimination against illegitimate children, has been adopted on June
25, 1976, and shall probably enter into force in 1977. A draft on matrimonial property has been completed, and work has started on a new divorce
law.
Our purpose here is mainly to give some explanation of gaps in the
4. Bundesgesetz die gemischten Ehen betreffend (3 Dec. 1850) AS AF Bd 2 at
130; Nachtragsgesetz betreffend die gemischten Ehen (3 Feb. 1962) AS AF Bd 7 at
126; Bundesgesetz betreffend Feststellung und Beurkundung des Zivilstandes und der

Ehe (24 Dec. 1974) AS NF Bd 1 at 515. Arts. 25 et seq.
5. E. HUBER, SYSTEM UND GESCHICHTE DES SCHWEIZERISCHEN PRIVATRECHTS,
4 vols. (Berne 1888-1893).
6. E. HUBER, ERLAUTERUNGEN ZUM VORENTWURF DES SCHWEIZERISCHE
ZIVILGESETZBUCH 3 vols. (2d ed. Berne 1914).
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Code and the process through which they are filled by judicial discretion and
by "the judge as legislator," according to the introductory articles of the
Code, especially Articles 1(2) and 4. The German and French originals of
7
Articles 1-4, and an English translation, are set out in an Appendix.
First we shall draw attention to the differences between the German
and Swiss Codes. We shall also discuss "doctrine and judicial tradition"
according to Article 1(3), and make some remarks on the binding force of
precedents.
II.

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE SWISS CIVIL CODE AND
THE GERMAN CIVIL CODE

The Swiss Civil Code came into force only in 1912, twelve years after
the German "Burgerliches Gesetzbuch," but it has a character of its own
and cannot be assigned without qualifications to the group of the codifications of German-speaking countries. Since German is spoken by the
majority of the Swiss population, however, (at present about 65% as against
18% French and 12% Italian, many of the latter being of Italian nationality)
the influence of German legal thinking and writing was of course very
important.
From a technical point of view, it is interesting to compare the Swiss
Civil Code and the German Civil Code. 8 The German Code is a purely
scientific work, made by lawyers for lawyers. It has been described as
embodying "the most precise and consistent legal terminology of all
times." Its 2385 articles are drafted in long, complicated phrases and
contain many cross-references. The Swiss Civil Code, on the other hand,
tried to combine a scientific approach with popularity. In many instances its
language is imprecise or even, taken literally, actually incorrect. 9 It is a
much disputed question whether the Swiss Code can really be understood
and applied by laymen and lay judges without the help of the jurists. A
precise answer to this question could only be given on the basis of extensive
sociological research which has not yet been undertaken. For various
reasons the layman would probably not get very far in applying the Code
correctly; he would tend to take isolated rules out of their context,
forgetting, for instance, that the general rules of the Code of Obligations
also apply. Additionally, a considerable body of case law, especially the
7. Infra.
8. See, R.

GMOR, DAS SCHWEIZERISCHE ZIVILGESETZBUCH VERGLICHEN MIT

DEM DEUTSCHEN BURGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH (Berne 1965) reviewed by Szladits, 15

AM. J. COMP. L. 384 (1966-67).
9. Liver, supra note 3, at nos. 119 et seq.
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case law of the Swiss Federal Court, has been built up and the Code cannot
be correctly applied without knowing it. It is probably beyond the reach of a
layman to research this case law. He could hardly follow the principle that
all three texts (German, French, Italian) have the same value and that one
should resort to the version which contains the real meaning of the law.
Thus there is no proof that the Swiss Code is more intelligible to
laymen than the German Civil Code. The Swiss Civil Code may be more
easily accessible to the many non-lawyer judges in Swiss courts. However,
experience with courts composed entirely of non-lawyers has not been
encouraging and there are few such courts left. At least the President of the
court or the Registrar (who in Switzerland is present during the deliberation
and drafts the judgments) would nearly always be a lawyer.
A much more important difference between the two Codes lies in the
fact that while the German Civil Code aimed at giving a very precise
regulation and at leaving as few gaps as possible, the Swiss Civil Code
deliberately was restricted to guidelines and principles in many instances
and left open a very wide field to judicial discretion and development of the
law. As opposed to the German strictness and perfectionism of the German
Civil Code, this may permit creative improvisation. But it may also be a
reminder of the inscription on the Federal Building in Berne: "Dei
providentia et hominum confusione Helvetia regitur" (The providence of
God and the confusion of man rules Helvetia).
Apart from the general tendency to reject the idea that a Code is
self-sufficient-according to G6ny,10 the Swiss legislator was the first
modern legislator to recognize that he needs the judge to achieve his own
tasks-there were several reasons which made necessary this kind of
legislation. The Swiss Civil Code had to be accepted by twenty-five
jurisdictions with very different conceptions. General rules may have been
easier to accept than specific ones. Also there existed a greater confidence in
the judge than is the case in some other countries. It is necessary to
remember that one of the main purposes of the earliest Swiss pacts was that a
person be tried by his own judge. Further, there is in Swiss practice a certain
reluctance to take an overly scientific approach to law, which is well
illustrated by an incident reported by Liver. I"A German "Herr Doktor"
quoting Baldus and Bartolus was told by a Swiss judge that he did not care
about those masters and that he would judge according to local custom and
law.
10. 2 F. GtNY, MITHODE D'INTERPRtTATION ET SOURCES EN DROIT PRIVE POSITIF
328 (2d ed. Paris 1932) [hereinafter cited as G6NY].

11.

Liver, supra note 3, at no.21.
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THE GAPS IN THE CODE

In order to assert the role of the judge in applying the Swiss Civil Code,
it is essential to remember that this Code deliberately rejects the idea that it
could be complete and give an answer to every conceivable question. This
eighteenth century theory was proclaimed by the French revolution, but the
Code Napoleon had already rejected it: Article 4 obliged the judge to decide
even if the Code did not give a clear answer. 12
The "Ecole d'exigse" and the "Begriffsjurisprudenz" of the
nineteenth century again wanted to deduce everything from the wording of
the law. The Swiss Code on the contrary is in line with G6ny's idea of" libre
recherche scientifique. " 13
It is thus recognized that the Code has some gaps, and there are several
theoretical distinctions amongst these gaps. We shall not go into the details
of these, in part controversial, distinctions but shall only consider them
insofar as they are useful for the comprehension of Articles 1 and 4 of the
14
Code.
The main distinction is between gaps intra legem and gaps praeter
legem.
A gap intra legem is a point which the legislator has deliberately left
open to be filled by means outside the law. The most important instance is
the reference to equity in Article 4, which has numerous applications
throughout the Code. Many authors also speak about gaps intra legem in
connection with the interpretation of general expressions such as "justified
interest." 5 However, it is not possible to draw a precise line between
questions which can be solved through interpretation and gaps.
The gaps praeter legerm are those where there is a lack of any
applicable provision of law (open gap), for instance, if an action is instituted
but no forum provided (Art. 157Swiss Civil Code). It may also exist where,
contrary to the system of the Code, there has been omitted a necessary
exception to a general rule (hidden gap).
Article 1(2) and Article 4 specifically relate to the filling of gaps.
12. Cf. PORTALIS, PRINCIPES FICONDS EN CONSIQUENCES, quoted in I GtNY,
supra note 10, at 99.
13. It is known that Huber knew and had a high regard for G6ny's work.
However, one is not certain to what extent particularly Article 1(2) was influenced by
Giny, nor for that matter by Aristotle. Cf. KOMMENTAR, supra note 1, at nos.I 1-13 re
Art. 1.
14. See DESCHENAUX, supra note 1, at 95, par. 12; GERMANN, supra note 1,at
111 et seq.
15. See FESTSCHRIFr GERMANN, supra note 1;

note 1, at 98.

contra, DESCHENAUX, supra
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Theoretically, Article 1(2) calls on the judge to set a new rule which shall be
applicable also to later cases, while Article 4 asks for a decision most
appropriate for a specific case. In practice, the difference of approach tends
to disappear' 6 - a decision under Article 1(2) can be very specific, and the
application of Article 4 tends also to follow some general criteria; mutatis
mutandis Article 1(3) is applicable. 17 In fixing the amount of" tort moral,"
for instance, the judge will take into account the sums allowed in former
cases.
Finally, one speaks about "gaps improperly so-called" where a
provision of the law is or has become contrary to what is thought to be
desirable or just. Normally, it is a task for the legislator, not for the judge, to
correct such "mistakes." However, to a certain extent such provisions can
be set aside according to Article 2(2) and the gap so created filled according
to. Article 1.8
IV. JUDICIAL DISCRETION UNDER ARTICLE 4
What is meant by "principles of justice and equity" in Article 4? The
German expression "Recht und Billigkeit" does not seem quite equivalent
to the French "r~gles du droit et de l'equiti." The doctrinal writers agree
that the words "Recht und Billigkeit" designate one single concept which
could also be stated as "billiges Recht"' 9 or (in my opinion) by "Billigkeit" (equity). What is meant is that the judge should give the most
appropriate and just decision in the particular case. He has to find the law by
a casuistic method - as opposed to the legislative method. He is not to be
inspired by feelings such as pity, sympathy, and so forth. His decision has to
be objectively supported. by reasons and has to take into account the
particular elements of the situation. Meier-Hayoz criticizes the French word
"rgles", because in Article 4, as opposed to Article 1(2), the judge does
not state a rule but only a decision in a single case. 20 On the contrary,
Deschenaux is of the opinion that the word "r gles" is appropriate,
16. KOMMENTAR, supra note 1, at nos.19-21 re Art. 4; FESTSCHRIFT GERMANN,
GERMANN, supra note 1, at 356,
KOMMENTAR, supra note 1, at n.53 re Art. 4.

supra note 1, at 154;
17.

364.

18. Id. at nos.295 et seq. re Art. 1; on the cases where the judge decides against
the wording of the Code, see Schnyder in FESTGABE Swiss FEDERAL COURT, supra
note 1.On Art. 2, see Bolgir, Abuse ofRights in France,Germany andSwitzerland: A
Survey of a Recent Chapterin Legal Doctrine, 35 LA. L. REV. 1015, 1030 (1975).
19. KOMMENTAR, supra note 1, at no. 1 re Art. 4; DESCHENAUX, LE TRAITEMENT
DE L'IQUITi EN DROIT SUISSE, RECRUEIL DE TRAVAUX SUISSES PRISENTf-S AU Ville

CONGRtS INTERNATIONAL DE DROIT COMPARI 27 (Bile 1970). For a possible different
meaning, see FESTSCHRIFr GERMANN, supra note 1, at 156.
20. KOMMENTAR, supra note 1, at no. 15 re Art. 4.

688
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because even when applying Article 4, the judge must elaborate criteria
which can be used in other cases and which, even if they are very
specialized, do constitute rules.2 It is obvious however that a decision
rendered according to Article 4 cannot be exhaustively reasoned; there
remains a field of discretionary power of the judge in weighing the
circumstances. Also the Swiss Federal Court exercises a certain restraint in
revising decisions of lower courts in this field. It can revise such a decision,
because it involves a question of law, not of fact (questions of fact cannot be
reviewed by the Swiss Federal Court).22
Article 4 enumerates three cases in which the judge must decide
according to equity (discretion - circumstances - material ground). However, this enumeration is not exhaustive because there are also other cases
where judicial discretion is open, for instance, when the Code states that the
judge "can" decide according to equity, or whenever it uses the word
"iquitable." The same discretion is also indicated when Article 163(3)
Code of Obligations says that the judge must reduce conventional penalties
which he considers exaggerated.
Of the many provisions to which Article 4 applies, we shall quote but
one example for each of the three cases mentioned. According to Article
706(2) Swiss Civil Code, if a source of water has been cut without fault, the
judge decides if damages are due, and to what extent (point left to the
discretion of the judge). Damages are fixed according to circumstancesand
the gravity of the fault according to Article 43(1) Code of Obligations. A
person may change his name if the grounds alleged are material (Art. 30
23
Swiss Civil Code).
V.

THE

JUDGE ACTING AS A LEGISLATOR UNDER ARTICLE

1(2)

The best known provision of the preliminary title of the Swiss Civil
Code is of course Article 1. The first paragraph expresses the idea that the
Code applies not only to questions expressly mentioned, but also to those
implied from its spirit. This contrasts with the restrictive interpretation of
statutes usually employed by common law judges. Paragraph 2 relates to
"doctrine and judicial tradition" which will be discussed later.
However, it is Article 1(2) which has attracted the greatest attention.
21.

DESCHENAUX, supra note 1, at 132.
22. See L. ENGLER, DIE UEBERPRUFUNG VON ERNESSENSENTSCHEIDEN GEMASS
ART. 4 SCHWEIZERISCHES ZIVILGESETZBUCH INDER NEUEREN BUNDESGERICHTLICHEN
RECHTSPRECHUNG (dissertation Fribourg, Zurich 1974).
23. See DESCHENAUX, supra note 1, at 136 et seq.; KOMMENTAR, supra note 1,

at nos.56-73 re Art. 1.

1977]

ROLE OF JUDGE UNDER SWISS CODE

As already mentioned, it is not known how much Huber was influenced by
G6ny who discussed the provision with great satisfaction in the second
edition of his book and even considered the formula as the best summary of
his own developments.24
When does the law not furnish an applicable provision? First, there
could be some fields which are not covered by the Code or by another
statute, but this situation is not very likely to occur. The most important
instance seems to be Private International Law insofar as it is not embodied
in the 1891 statute. Such is the case for the whole law of conflicts relating to
contracts, torts, and obligations in general. The Swiss Federal Court has
built up an impressive body of judge-made law in that field25 without even
going through the form of referring to Article 1(2) when it states a new rule
26
of modifies an existing one.
In fields which are codified, the judge can apply Article 1(2) only when
there really is a gap. Several decisions state that this should not be admitted
too easily. 27 The most typical case is the filling of gaps praeter legem.
However, Meier-Hayoz 28 and Germann 29 apply the same principle to gaps
intra legem insofar as they do not fall under Article 4. Deschenaux3 ° and
Tuor/Schnyder 3" express some doubts about this.
Article 1(2) first refers to customary law. Its place is rather small and
nothing more will be said of this element because the filling of gaps by the
judge acting as a legislator is much more important. 32 By stating that the
24. GtNY, supra note 10, at 308, 326 in no.204.
25. F. Vischer, Der Richter als Gesetzgeber im Internationalprivatrecht, in 12
SCHWEIZERISCHES JAHRBUCH FOR INTERNATIONALES RECHT75 (1955); Schnitzer, Les

contrats internationauxen droitinternationalprivisuisse,123 RECEUIL DES COURS DE
L'ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 541 (1968).

26. E.g., Swiss Federal Court Reports 100 II, 11, 20, 39,451. Changes are rather
frequent nowadays, while in 1951 Du Pasquier (at 71) found no reversal by the Swiss
Federal Court of a rule stated under Article 1(2).
27. E.g. 90 1 141; 100 Ib 157. There is only a gap if neither the wording nor the
content of the statute found through interpretation gives a rule, and if no solution can
be found by means of analogy. See also 94 II 305: refusal to fill an alleged gap in a tax
statute by customary law. See 101 Ib 379 for a recent case where administrative law
was involved.
28. FESTSCHRIFT GERMANN, supra note 1, at 155; more doubtful, KOMMENTAR,
supra note 1, at 263 re Art. I.
29. GERMANN, supra note 1, at 121. However, the filling of gaps only begins
when the written provision has been thoroughly interpreted according to its own text
and to other parts of the statute.
30. DESCHENAUX, supra note 1, at 107.
31. TUOR & SCHNYDER, supra note 1, at 38, 42.
32. KOMMENTAR, supra note 1, at nos.233-50 re Art. 1. For example of customary law, see Du Pasquier, supra note 1, at 29.
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judge should act as if he were a legislator, it is meant that he has to find a rule
of law which is not only appropriate to the case at hand, but which will be
applicable to future cases and which will fit into the system of existing law.
For that purpose he has to examine whether there is not in the existing law a
rule relating to a situation comparable to the one at hand, and which could be
applied by analogy. More generally, he should stay within the system and
the spirit of the Code. The judge should examine all the interests involved
and weigh their respective values as a legislator would do. He also has to
consider the postulate of legal security.
Article 1(3) gives an indication of the tools available to the judge, but
"approved legal doctrine and judicial tradition" are not the only ones.
Thus, Meier-Hayoz stresses especially that the judge, when filling gaps,
should resort to comparative law as does the legislator when preparing a new
statute.33 This idea is expressly embodied in Article 7 of the Swiss Law on
Maritime Navigation 34 which directs the judge to decide according to
generally accepted principles of maritime law, if he finds no rules in the
statute or in treaties. In the absence of such principles, he is directed to act as
a legislator, taking into account law and custom, doctrine and case-law of
seafaring countries.
How has Article 1(2) worked in practice? The judges certainly have not
abused their power to act as legislators. The contrary may be true. In his
most recent article, Meier-Hayoz sounds a somewhat pessimistic note; 35 he
finds that judges are very reluctant to assume the responsibility of acting
modo legislatoris. Such a function is a burden, not a joy for them. They
prefer to use arguments which make the decision appear as if it was a mere
interpretation of the existing law. They also prefer to hide the policy
considerations, which are the real grounds of decision, behind constructive
arguments .36
Meier-Hayoz expresses also some criticism of Article 1 itself, which
makes too clear-cut a distinction between two functions of the judge:
interpretation according to paragraph 1 and gap-filling under paragraph 2.
In fact, there are few cases which are decided entirely by statute or entirely
by the judge. In the great bulk of cases the decision is a result of a
combination of interaction of statute law and judge-made law. The part of
each may vary, but the legal process is always the same. Meier-Hayoz
33. KOMMENTAR, supra note 1, at nos.355 et seq. re Art. 1.
34. AS (1956) p. 1356.
35. FESTSCHRIFT GULDENER, supra note 1, at 197 et seq. See also KOMMENTAR,
supra note 1, at no.337 re Art. 1.
36. See his criticism on the Cardo case in the text at notes 50-53,infra.
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would prefer to abandon the idea of an "application" of pre-existing law by
the judge and move towards a concept of "law in making" which combines
the rule and the application of the rule, the decision finding and the
formulation of rules. Swiss judges may be reluctant to act modo legislatoris
because the training of lawyers places excessive emphasis on the application
of existing law and neglects the question of creation of law.
Most of these criticisms are certainly well founded. For example, there
are no specific courses on "jurisprudence" in Swiss universities. However
there is no doubt that professors give increasing attention to these kinds of
problems.
Even if Article 1(2) has not had as far-reaching effects as one could
have expected, many discussions on the international level have shown that
Swiss lawyers feel less bound by the letter of the law than their colleagues in
other continental countries. Extensive research would be necessary to
ascertain the extent of this difference in approach.
VI.

CASES WHERE THE JUDGE ACTED AS A LEGISLATOR

(a) A very clear example of a gap is found where the Code creates an
action, but.does not provide a forum. It is surprising that only recently such
gaps have been discovered in matters relating to matrimonial proceedings.
The Swiss Civil Code does not provide a forum for the "Eheschutzmassnahmen" of Articles 169 et seq. These are measures a judge can take
before there are divorce or separation proceedings. The Swiss Federal Court
judged that the forum rule in matters of divorce of Article 144 (domicile of
actor) should inspire the filling of the gap. 37 A few years later, the Court had
to decide which judge could terminate such measures if they were no longer
necessary. The courts of the Cantons had found three different solutions.
The Swiss Federal Court preferred the forum of the defendant because
normally the measures would have been taken in his favor and one should
not ask him to defend at the actor's domicile. 38 The general principle actor
sequiturforum rei was here preferred to the forum actoris.
Two years later the Swiss Federal Court had to deal with a modification
of a pension determined in a separation judgment. The Court, basing the
decision on Article 1, fixed the forum for such an action at the defendant's
domicile.

39

(b) Some gaps may appear because of new technical developments.
37. Swiss Federal Court Reports 86 II 305, see also 93 11 3.
38. Swiss Federal Court Reports 93 II 4.
39. Swiss Federal Court Reports 95 II 73.
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Article 684 forbids a landowner to pursue activities which create excessive
nuisances for the neighbors. The Swiss Civil Code states only two possibilities: either the nuisances are excessive and they have to stop, or they
are not excessive, and can continue. However, in 1964, the Swiss Federal
Court had to decide a case, where nearby building activities caused damage
to a tea-room and bakery; during two years this place could only be reached
with some difficulty.4 0 Part of the street had to be used for building
machinery. The nuisances were clearly excessive, but they were necessary;
otherwise the whole building project would have to be abandoned. The
Swiss Federal Court found a gap which could hardly have been discovered
when the Swiss Civil Code came into force, but which had become more
apparent since the development of modern mechanical building methods
and the increased use of public ground for that purpose. 4 It decided that this
gap had to be filled modo legislatoris and that the builder's activity had to be
tolerated but he must pay damages.
(c) The declaration of illegitimacy of a child furnished a good illustration of discovering and filling a gap. Article 253 Swiss Civil Code very
clearly states that only the husband has an action against the child and his
mother. If he can prove that he could not possibly be the father, the child will
be declared illegitimate. So it is only up to the husband to decide whether he
wishes to draw the consequences from the fact that a child presumed
legitimate is not his own.
However, it appeared that sometimes it would be in the interest of the
child to reverse an erroneous presumption of legitimacy.4 2 This was
especially the case where the mother divorced the "Registervater" (father
according to the presumption of legitimacy) and married the real father of
the child. The child could only be legitimated by the real parents after a
declaration of illegitimacy which could be requested only by the former
husband.
The Swiss Federal Court held for a long time that the Code had
deliberately not provided for an action by the child.4 3 But such actions
succeeded in several courts of the Cantons and finally the Swiss Federal
Court changed its point of view." The Court examined whether the problem
40. Swiss Federal Court Reports 91 11 100, 196.
41. FESTSCHRIFr GULDENER, supra note 1,at 196, considers this an example of a
"gap improperly said" because the System of the Code was complete. This does not
seem to be the court's opinion, which does not specify the nature of the gap.
42. In England, the same thing appeared; cf. D.
(1969).

43. Swiss Federal Court Reports 73 II 204.
44. Swiss Federal Court Reports 88 II 477.
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had been overlooked by the legislator. This was not clear, but seemed rather
unlikely, especially in view of the fact that the German Civil Code
deliberately excluded such an action a few years before the Swiss Civil Code
was drafted. However, the Court said that, even if the omission had been
deliberate, this could not prevent the Court from examining whether the
45
ratiolegis and the balancing of respective interests could justify a change.
Then the Court concluded that the rule of Article 253 as it stands is not
just unsatisfactory-in this case it could not be changed except by legislation-but incomplete, in the context of the whole system of the law.
Thus, differing from former cases, the Court found a gap which could
be filled. The Swiss Federal Court considered that Article 253 Swiss Civil
Code purported to secure the stability of marriage and legitimacy but that,
according to the Code, this public interest had to yield to the husband's
interest if he wanted to sue. The Court was of the opinion that the interest of
the child to be incorporated in the "real" family was as worthy of protection
as the husband's interest. A further argument was drawn from Article 256
which, when the husband is dead or has disappeared, gives an action to
coheirs or people excluded from the succession in certain cases. This purely
financial interest is certainly less important than the child's interest.
On the strength of this reasoning, the Swiss Federal Court gave an
action to the child, but only on the condition that the first marriage be
dissolved and the child legitimated by his father. The decision has generally
been approved. In 1972 the Superior Court of Zurich took a further step and
gave an action even to a child who would not afterwards be legitimated by
6
his real father.
Article 256 as amended by the new Child Law removes some of the
restrictions maintained by the Court. The child will have an action if the
spouses have lived separately at any time when he was a minor. However,
the mother will have no action of her own.
Thus, in a code system, the judge-made law finally found its way into
the written law. The same thing happened concerning the nullity of
marriages of which the sole purpose was to acquire Swiss nationality (Art.
120(4), Swiss Civil Code).47
45. This shows a method of interpretation which does not stick to the historical
meaning but takes into account the needs of changing circumstances. On this
question, see KOMMENTAR, supra note 1, at no.132 re Art. 1; DESCHENAUX, supra
note 1, at 98; K. Oftinger, Ueberblick fiberdie Problematikund einigeHauptpunkteder
Interpretation, 63 SCHWEIZERISCHE JURISTEN-ZEITUNG 358 (1967).
46. 69 SCHWEIZERISCHE JURISTEN-ZEITUNG 122 (1973).

47. There are numerous other examples, e.g., Swiss Federal
Court Reports 92 11 182, now embodied in the revised Arts. 336(1) and 361 CODE OF
OBLIGATIONS.
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(d) The matter of permitting a child to sue for a declaration of
illegitimacy found its counterpart in the field of private international law. In
many cases, an action by the child would have been especially desirable
where the legal father was a foreign worker, who had disappeared in the
meantime. But even when the Swiss Federal Court admitted the child's
action in internal law, another difficulty arose in the field of conflicts.
According to Article 8 of the Swiss law of 1891 on Private International
Law, as it was generally understood, the forum for such an action was in the
country of the nationality of the legal father, and his national law was
applicable. This brought not only practical complications, but also the
possibility that there might be no action under the father's law. The situation
was particularly shocking because after a successful action the child would
have acquired the mother's Swiss nationality.
In a remarkable decision of September 4, 1969,48 the Superior Court of
Zurich gave the child an action in Switzerland. The Court based its
reasoning on two arguments. First, it considered that Article 8 of the law of
1891, drafted in view of relations between Cantons, was applicable to
international cases only by way of analogy (Art. 32) and that the similarity
of situations which is presupposed by analogy did not exist. While citizens
of all Cantons had to be treated the same way, this is not so in a case where
there are Swiss and foreign parties involved. Thus the Court found a gap in
the sense of Article 1(2) of the Swiss Civil Code.
The other argument is based on a parallel between the former exclusive
right of the husband to sue and the exclusive jurisdiction of his national
state. The suppression of the first makes the second meaningless, and
consequently there is a gap as well. In this context, the Court considers the
gap as "rechtspolitischer Natur" and consequently corrects it through the
49
operation of Article 2(2) Swiss Civil Code.
48. 65 SCHWEIZERISCHE JURISTEN-ZEITUNG 374 (1969). On this decision, see A.
Bucher, Grundfragen der Anknipfungsgerechtigkeit im internationalenPrivatrecht,
JUR. FAKULT.T DER UNIVERSITAT BASEL, SCHRIFTENREIHE DES INSTITUTS FUR IN-

TERNATIONALES RECHT UND INTERNATIONALE BEZIEHUNGEN, Heft 22,159 and at 151
et seq. on former decisions (Basel & Stuttgart 1975). The Swiss Federal Court has not
yet deceded on the question, but in an unofficially published case (Colla, in 28
SCHWEIZERISCHES JAHRBUCH FOR INTERNATIONALES RECHT 399 (1972), it expressed
some doubts on the justification of the forum based on nationality. See also F.
Knoepfler, L 'interiritde l'enfant et le droit internationalprivi, in FESTGABE SWISS
FEDERAL COURT, supra note 1, at 476. We may add that since April 1, 1973, the
desired result can also be obtained through an adoption of the child by the real father;
see E. Gotz, 44 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR ZIVILSTANDSWESEN 106 (1976).
49. The Court quotes KOMMENTAR, supra note 1, at no.295 et seq. re Art. 1.
More precisely, one should say that Article 2(2) permits the disregard of a statutory
rule, but that the resulting gap should be filled under Article 1(2); cf. MEIER-HAYOZ,
FESTSCHRIFr GULDENER supra note 1, at 196.
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The Court took jurisdiction on the basis of the nationality which the
child would acquire if the suit was successful. This is of course something of
a circulus vitiosus. Personally, we preferred that the court finally base its

jurisdiction on the domicile or habitual residence of the mother and the
child. It could have considered that the Law of 1891 did not take into
account situations where spouses had different nationalities which was very
exceptional at the time of that enactment.
(e) This idea applies even more to cases of divorce between spouses of
different nationalities. Article 7h(1) of the Law of 1891 states that the
foreign actor must prove that the ground of divorce and the Swiss jurisdiction are recognized in his country of nationality. In the case of spouses of
different nationalities the Swiss Federal Court for a long time obliged the
actor to prove these two points in his own national law as well as in the
spouse's national law. The reason was that Swiss courts should not render
divorce judgments between foreigners which would not be recognized in a
party's national state. However, in 1968, the Court reversed this point of
view and declared that the actor had only to prove that his national law, or
even one of his several national laws, did admit the ground of divorce and
the Swiss jurisdiction. 5" In fact, in that case, the husband was Italian; the
plaintiff's wife was both French and Italian. Proof according to French law
was deemed sufficient.
Meier-Hayoz critizes the decision because the Court, instead of
admitting that it had changed its policy in order to facilitate divorces,
pretended to go back to a stricter construction of Article 7h(1).5' Personally,
we would have preferred the same result on another basis. Both spouses
were domiciled in Switzerland. The Court, following the opinion of many
Swiss writers, could very well have considered that the divorce of spouses
of different nationalities did not fall under Article 7h(l). It could then have
admitted a gap and filled it with a reference to the law and the jurisdiction of
the domicile, thus following the example set by the French Cour de
Cassation in the famous Riv~re case. 52 The solution given by the Swiss
Federal Court differentiates the possibilities available to the spouses: the
Italian husband could not have sued his wife - or only under the narrower
50. Cardo v. Cardo, Swiss Federal Court Reports 94 II 69.
51. FESTSCHRIFr GULDENER, supra note 1, at 204; see also Bucher, supra note
48, at 140 et seq.
52. REVUE CRITIQUE 412 (1953); see G.A.L. Droz, Une constructionpritorienne
exemplaire: la loi applicable au divorce di'poux de nationalitisdifferentes en droit
international priv fran§ais, 9 NEDERLANDS TIJDSCHRIFr VOR INTERNATIONAAL
RECHT, DE CONFLICTU LEGUM 125 (Milanges Kollewijn-Offerhaus, Leyden 1962).
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53
conditions provided by Italian law.
The case certainly illustrates the reluctance of even the Supreme Court
to act as a legislator.

VII.

APPROVED DOCTRINE AND JUDICIAL TRADITION
ACCORDING TO ARTICLE

1(3)

Looking now to Article 1(3), the first question is whether this provision
applies only to paragraph 2 or to both paragraphs I and 2. The latter answer
is accpeted now by all writers. 54 The wording of the three texts is not quite
similar. The German" Ueberlieferung" is translated into French and Italian
by "jurisprudence" (case law). This definition is a bit narrow, as nonjudicial practice is also important in some cases. The translation of
"bewdihrt," which implies an element of appreciation, is not quite accurately rendered by "consacris" which could also mean a solution actually
accepted by the courts but subject to criticism. It seems of little importance
whether the judge follows ("folgt") or is inspired ("s'inspire") by
doctrine and judicial tradition. Deschenaux'is of the opinion that the French
formula is better, the doctrine not being a source of law which the judge is
bound to follow."
Legal doctrine has to be approved - "bewdhrt." This is a critical rather
than an historical appreciation. Neither unanimity of writers, nor antiquity,
makes a doctrine "approved." It should be noted that there are no "books
of authority" in Swiss law. The opinion of an author, who is well-known in
his field, carries great weight, but is also subject to criticism. The judge
must state in his decision why he prefers one opinion to another.
Doctrine in the sense of Article 1(3) is by no means restricted to Swiss
writers. Foreign writers are frequently cited by the Federal Court. Thus, in a
decision formally recognizing party autonomy in the field of choice of law
for contracts, the Federal Court made an extensive review of foreign
56
opinions and cases, and also international conventions.
Another important instance is the Dal Bosco case, decided in 197 L"
The Swiss Federal Court, reversing its former point of view, recognized the
marriage in Denmark of an Italian who had been divorced in Switzerland
53. D. Dutoit, L'avenir possible du rattachement 6 la loi nationale en droit
international privi suisse, 26

ANNUAIRE SUISSE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 49

(1969-70).
54.
seq.
55.

DESCHENAUX,

supra note 1, at 119; KOMMENTAR, supra note 1, at nos. 423 et

Id. at 121.

56. Swiss Federal Court Reports 91 11 44.
57. Swiss Federal Court Reports 97 I 389.
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(according to Swiss law) from his wife who was a Swiss-Italian double
national. The Court discussed at length the arguments of Swiss writers on
this point and also the cases and opinions in other countries. While rejecting
several arguments based on different theories of private international law,
the Court admitted that "DerKritik am EntscheideCaliaromuss daher vom
menschlichen and sozialen Gesichtspunkt aus Recht gegehen werden."
[Criticism of the Caliaro decision must be made from the social and humane
viewpoint.] It recognized the marriage on grounds of internal harmony of
the Swiss legal system and public policy (ordre public).
We have already said that judicial tradition does not consist only of
judgments. "Ueberlieferung," as the German text states, comprises also
the practice of administrative authorities (which is quite important in fields
such as marriage, adoption, guardianship) and usages generally followed,
for instance, by merchants.
The bulk of judicial tradition lies, of course, in case law. The most
authoritative cases are the published decisions of the Swiss Federal Court.
Most decisions in private law are rendered by the Federal Court on appeal
from the highest court of the Canton ("Berufung", "recours en reforme"), but decisions rendered by the administrative and public law
chambers can also relate to private law. The Swiss Federal Court decides
which cases are to be published, but it frequently cites also its own
unpublished cases. This is not quite satisfactory and gives some advantage
to parties-or attorneys-who had the opportunity to know about those
58
cases.
Decisions of courts of the Cantons are much less frequently cited by the
Swiss Federal Court or by courts of other Cantons. One reason is that only in
the largest Cantons are the decisions published regularly and without delay.
There are probably few important cases where a legal point is disputed
which do not go to the Swiss Federal Court (which proceeds with more
speed and less expense than many lower courts). Nevertheless, there have
been several instances where courts of the Cantons have taken the lead in
bringing about a desirable change against the standing opinion of the Swiss
Federal Court, and were finally followed by the latter.59

VIII.

THE QUESTION OF THE BINDING FORCE OF PRECEDENT

This brings us to the question of the binding force of precedent.'

In

58. Which can be obtained if one knows about their existence; cf. DESCHENAUX,
supra note 1, at 124.

59. Cf.

DESCHENAUX at 127, note 38.
60. On the question in general, see GERMANN, supra note 1, at 227-77, and his
former contributions in 68 NF ZEITSCHRIFr FOR SCHWEIZERISCHES RECHT 297 et seq.,
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Switzerland, there is of course no doctrine of stare decisis in the common
law sense. Moreover, at the time when the Code was drafted, doctrinal
opinion on the continent was opposed to any binding force of precedent. 6
This may explain why Article 1(3) places doctrine and tradition, including
case law, on the same level. Nevertheless, a doctrine of limited binding
force of precedent has become firmly established in Switzerland.
The Swiss Federal Court often mentions "la loi et la jurisprudence"

as if they had the same force. The published decisions are preceded by an
abstract in three languages stating the principle on which the case was
decided.
As a rule, the Swiss Federal Court follows its own precedents. When it
departs from a former decision, it does so only after exhaustive discussion,
and the abstract will then mention: "changement de jurisprudence."

Similarly, the courts of the Cantons tend to follow their own precedents, and the precedents set by the Swiss Federal Court. But, as the Swiss
Federal Court has stated several times, the lower courts are not bound. They
may reject the opinion of the Federal Court on good grounds. On appeal, the
Swiss Federal Court will examine whether it can agree with the change
made by the lower court, or whether it will adhere to its own precedent.
The binding force of precedent depends to a certain extent on whether
the judge has to apply a statutory rule, or a judicial rule found under Article
1(2). In the first case, departing from precedent is justified if the new
interpretation conforms more to the real meaning of the law. In the case of a
rule set by a judge acting as a legislator, the change has to be based on the
considerations which a legislator would take into account, including the
62
necessity for a certain stability of the law.
We may add here that one can draw from Article 1(2) an argument for a
certain binding force of precedents, It would make no sense to oblige the
judge to act as a legislator in a given situation if his decision had no binding
63
force whatsoever for similar subsequent cases.
IX.

CONCLUSION

We have tried to show that under a code system, which does not
423 et seq. (1949) and in II ACTA INSTITUTI UPPSALENSIS IURISPRUDENTIAE COMPARATIVAE (1959).
61. KOMMENTAR,

supra note 1, at no. 499 re Art. 1; see also G. Gorla, Dans
quelle mesure la jurisprudence et la doctrine sont-elles des sources du droit?,
RAPPORTS NATIONAUX ITALIENS AU ixe CONGRtS INTERNATIONAL DE DROIT COMPARI,
TtfHRAN 1974, 55 (Milan 1974), and other contributions to that Congress.
62. Id. at nos. 510-18 re Art. 1.
63. Id.at no. 501 re Art. 1.
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purport to be exhaustive, there is a large field where the judge is sufficiently
free to adapt the law to the needs of the everchanging situations of life.
Common lawyers may discover some similarities with the reasoning of their
own judges. It would be a much more demanding task to attempt to
determine precisely how much-or how little-the reasoning of a Swiss
judge who avails himself of the opportunities opened by Article 1(2) differs
from that of a common law judge.
At this point we would like to conclude by quoting Benjamin N.
Cardozo. After rejecting judicial impressionism and stating that "Our
jurisprudence has held fast to Kant's categorical imperative, 'Act on a
maxim which thou canst will to be law universal"', he continues "I think
the tone and temper in which the modern judge should set about his task are
well expressed in the first article of the Swiss Civil Code of 1907."
64. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OFTHE JUDICIAL
printing 1964) (1st ed. Yale Univ. Press 1921).
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Appendix
SWISS CIVIL CODE ARTICLES 1-4
EINLEITUNG

TITRE PRILIMINAIRE

PRELIMINARY CHAPTER

Art. I

Art. I

Art. I

A. Anwendung des
Rechts

A.

Das Gesetz findet auf alle
AnwenRechtsfragen
dung, fir die es nach
Wortlaut oder Auslegung
eine Bestimmung enthilt.

matires

Kann dem Gesetze keine
Vorschrift

entnommen

werden, so soil der Richter nach Gewohnheitsrecht und, wo auch ein
solches fehlt, nach der
Regel entscheiden, die er
als Gesetzgeber aufstellen wurde.
Er folgt dabei bewihrter
und
UeberLahre
lieferung.

Application de la loi

A.

Application of Law

l'esprit de l'une de ses

The Code governs all
questions of law which
come within the letter or
the spirit of any of its

dispositions.

provisions.

A d~faut d'une disposition I6gale applicable, le
juge prononce selon le
droit coutumier et, A d6faut d'une coutume, selon
les r~gles qu'il 6tablirait
s'il avait A faire acte de
ligislateur.

If the Code does not fur-

II s'inspire des solutions
consacr~es par la doctrine
et la jurisprudence.

In this he shall be guided
by approved legal docand
judicial
trine
tradition.

La loi r6git toutes les
auxquelles

se

rapportent ]a lettre ou

nish an applicable provi-

sion, the judge shall decide in accordance with
customary law, and failing that, according to the
rule which he would establish as legislator.
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Art. 2

Art. 2

Art. 2

B. Inhalt der
Rechtsverhiiltnisse

B. Etendue des droits
civils

B.

Limits of civil rights

I. Handeln nach Treu
und Glauben

I.

Devoirs giniraux

I.

Misuse of a right

Jedermann hat in der AusUbung seiner Rechte und
in der Erfiillung seiner
Pflichten nach Treu und
Glauben zu handeln.
Misoffenbare
Der
sbrauch eines Rechtes
keinen
findet
Rechtsschutz.
Art. 3
II.

Guter Glaube

Chacun est tenu d'exercer
ses droits et d'ex6cuter
ses obligations selon les
r~gles de la bonne foi.

Every person is bound to
exercise his rights and fulfil his obligations according to the principles of
good faith.

L'abus manifeste d'un
droit n'est pas prot6g6 par
la Ioi.

The law does not sanction
the evident abuse of a
right.

Art. 3

Art. 3

II.

Bonne foi

II.

Good Faith

Wo das Gesetz eine Rechtswirkung an den guten
Glauben einer Person
gekniipft hat, ist dessen
Dasein zu vermuten. Wer
bei der Aufmerksamkeit,
wie sie nach den Umstanden von ihm verlangt werden darf, nicht gutgldubig
sein konnte, ist nicht berechtigt, sich auf den guten Glauben zu berufen.
Art. 4

La bonne foi est pr6sum6e, Iorsque la loi en
fait d6pendre la naissance
ou les effets d'un droit.
Nul ne peut invoquer sa
bonne foi, si elle est incompatible avec l'attention que les circonstances
permettaient d'exiger de
lui.

Good faith is presumed
whenever the existence or
the effects of a right has
been expressly made to
depend on the observance
of good faith. No person
can plead his good faith
fides in any case where he
has failed to exercise the
degree of care required by
the circumstances.

Art. 4

Art. 4

III. Richterliches
Ermessen

III. Pouvoir d'appricia- III.
tion du juge

Wo das Gesetz den Richter auf sein Ermessen
oder auf die Wiirdigung
der Umstdinde oder auf
wichtige Griinde ven
weist, hat er seine Entscheidung nach Recht
und Billigkeit zu treffen.

Le juge applique les regles du droit et de 1'6quit6,
lorsque la loi r6serve son
pouvoir d'appr6ciation ou
qu'elle le charge de prononcer en tenant compte
soit des circonstances,
soit de justes motifs.

Discretion of judge

Where the law expressly
leaves a point to the discretion of the judge, or
directs him to take circumstances into consideration, or to appreciate
whether a ground alleged
is material, he must base
his decision on principles
of justice and equity.

